Still searching for (food) sovereignty: Why are radical discourses only partially mobilised in the independent Anglo-Caribbean? by Thompson, M.S.
This is a repository copy of Still searching for (food) sovereignty: Why are radical 
discourses only partially mobilised in the independent Anglo-Caribbean?.




Thompson, M.S. orcid.org/0000-0002-2860-8478 (2019) Still searching for (food) 
sovereignty: Why are radical discourses only partially mobilised in the independent Anglo-
Caribbean? Geoforum, 101. pp. 90-99. ISSN 0016-7185 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2019.02.028





This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 
(CC BY-NC-ND) licence. This licence only allows you to download this work and share it with others as long 
as you credit the authors, but you can’t change the article in any way or use it commercially. More 
information and the full terms of the licence here: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
	
	 1	
Still Searching for (Food) Sovereignty: Why are Radical Discourses only Partially 
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Research Fellow, Department of Politics, University of Sheffield 
 
Abstract 
The notion of ‘food sovereignty’ is often surprisingly absent in food and 
agricultural discourses in the Anglo-Caribbean, where over the past half century 
policy-making has aligned with conventional ‘food security’ approaches. This 
paper argues that, in addition to its contemporary entrenchment within a neoliberal 
environment, this is also due to the nature of ‘sovereignty’ itself in a region which 
has been shaped by a distinctive colonial, social and economic history. In order to 
demonstrate this, firstly, it makes the case for why, in the context of rising food 
imports and enduring structural legacies, food sovereignty matters in the Anglo-
Caribbean. Secondly, it charts changes in the regional policy of the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM) to show how, despite repeated calls to increase self-
sufficiency, conventional neoliberal approaches to agricultural development and 
food security have predominated since the 1970s. Finally, it identifies and analyses 
limited instances where food sovereignty discourses have been mobilized, by 
farmers’ groups and political actors, and interrogates the  meaning of both 
‘internal’ and ‘external’ sovereignty itself in this post-colonial context. It finds 
mobilisations of food sovereignty to be characterised by a repeated conflation of 
domestic food production with the concept’s ideological principles as a political 
project, and a particular understanding of sovereignty that places an emphasis on 
‘the state’ and ‘the region’ over ‘the people’. This shows that the very nature of 
‘sovereignty’ itself plays a critical role in both the translation of, and possibilities 
mobilising for ‘food sovereignty’ as a radical project as envisaged in the wider 
literature. 
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1. Introduction  
The independent Anglo-Caribbean has, since the time of colonial conquest, been entrenched in 
inequitable relations of food production, distribution and consumption. Its contemporary food 
system is characterised by low levels of domestic production, increasing dependency on imports, 
nutritionally poor diets, non-communicable diseases, and vulnerability to fluctuations in 
international markets, climate change and natural disasters, which pose a number of challenges 
to policy-makers (Beckford and Rhiney, 2016; CARICOM, 2010). Given the increasing 
prominence of ‘food sovereignty’ as an intellectual, social and political movement globally, we 
might expect some of its key tenets to be more deeply embedded into agricultural policy-making 
and activism in this context. This is particularly so given that the region borders South and 
Central America, which has - at first glance - an analogous colonial history. It is also where the 
concept originates and has even been incorporated into state policy in several countries.  
This article argues that, whilst food sovereignty has at times been mobilised by both 
farmers and politicians in the region, its broader application has remained surprisingly partial 
and limited. To explore this apparent disjuncture, the paper analyses how and why food 
sovereignty is articulated and invoked in particular ways. Doing so raises questions about the 
enduring colonial legacy of structural constraints that has been amplified by the increasing 
liberalisation of trade, the distinctiveness of the peasant landscape, and how the limitations and 
possibilities for food sovereignty relate to the nature of both ‘internal’ and ‘external’ Caribbean 
sovereignty itself. It finds those partial mobilisations of food sovereignty to be often 
characterised by a conflation of domestic food production with the concept’s ideological 
principles as a political project, and an understanding of sovereignty that places an emphasis on 
‘the state’ and ‘the region’ over ‘the people’.  
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This paper consequently argues that the well-recognised structural constraints that afflict 
the agrarian possibilities of many post-colonial societies play out in distinctive ways in this 
collection of small English-speaking Caribbean islands, but that this alone does not explain why 
food sovereignty is often only partially mobilised in the region. Indeed, the very nature of how 
Anglo-Caribbean ‘sovereignty’ itself is understood and practised potentially undermines 
possibilities for mobilising food sovereignty discourses as a radical project. Instead, even when 
they are mobilised, these supposedly radical ideas are often adopted in ways that implicitly work 
within the neoliberal economic and liberal state environment rather, than against it. This case is 
instructive for debates about how food sovereignty travels to different contexts as it shows that 
the actual conditions of political sovereignty, along with their construction over time, play a 
crucial role in both its invocation and the possibilities for change. These findings feed into 
debates that trouble the concept, its meaning and potential, and how its significance and 
deployment depend upon distinctive ‘geohistories’ (Wittman, Desmarais, and Wiebe 2010; 
Edelman 2014; Jarosz, 2014); the role of food sovereignty’s sovereignty, the liberal sovereign 
state, and possibilities for democratic choice (Agarwal, 2014; Trauger 2014; Roman-Alcalá 
2016); and the role the state and agrarian movements vis-à-vis international trade and self-
sufficiency discourses (Burnett and Murphy, 2014; Clapp, 2017). These questions are pertinent 
for the Anglo-Caribbean, a group of nations, which, due to small size and structural constraints 
have historically had little power vis-à-vis the global economy.  
The article begins by examining how debates concerning the meaning of food 
sovereignty’s ‘sovereignty’ are complicated by the Caribbean post-colonial context. In the 
second section, it sets out why food sovereignty matters in this group of nations in the context 
of rising food import bills and colonial legacies of structure and taste. It then analyses the 
regional policy environment since the 1970s by assessing agricultural policy in the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM), the governance mechanism that sets the tone for policy in the region, 
and whose 15 members - with the exception of Haiti and Suriname - share a history of British 
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colonial rule, governance and independence.1 Drawing on analysis of interview data collected 
in Trinidad and Tobago (T&T) between 2012-2016, parliamentary transcripts and regional 
newspaper articles, the paper then explores some of the ways in which food sovereignty 
discourses have been partially mobilised by farmers’ groups and political actors. Finally, it 
analyses the nature of, and possibilities for food sovereignty in relation to post-colonial 
constructions of sovereignty itself. These components come together to show how distinctive 
colonial legacies have limited the development of some of the prerequisites for food 
sovereignty’s ‘internal’ and ‘external’ sovereignty – particularly in terms of popular sovereignty 
of the people and political sovereignty of the state.  
 
2. Sovereignty and Food Sovereignty in the Independent Anglo-Caribbean Context 
 
Interrogating the meaning of ‘sovereignty’ itself is crucial in the context of the Caribbean in 
order to understand the possibilities of moving towards meaningful ‘food sovereignty’ – defined 
as ‘the right of each nation to maintain and develop its own capacity to produce its basic foods, 
respecting cultural and productive diversity’ (La Vía Campesina, 1996: 1). In 2007, at Nyéléni, 
this definition was expanded to include reference to ‘the right of peoples…to define their own 
food and agriculture systems’ (La Vía Campesina, 2007) [Emphasis added]. There, the 
movement outlined six key pillars of food sovereignty: food for people; valuing food providers; 
localising food systems; putting control locally; building knowledge and skills; and working 
with nature.2 As definitions have expanded, political sovereignty has been seen to be a pre-
																																																								
1	CARICOM	was	established	in	1973	at	the	Treaty	of	Chaguaramas.	It	has	15	full	member	states:	Barbados,	
Jamaica	 and	 T&T	 (its	 founders),	 plus	 Antigua	 and	 Barbuda,	 Bahamas,	 Belize,	 Dominica,	 Grenada,	
Guyana,	Haiti,	Montserrat,	Saint	Kitts	and	Nevis,	Saint	Lucia,	Saint	Vincent	and	 the	Grenadines,	and	
Suriname.	 It	 has	 5	 associate	 members	 (all	 British	 Overseas	 Territories)	 and	 7	 observer	 states.	








requisite. For example, the Nyéleni (2007: 20) documents recognise that ‘food sovereignty is 
only possible if it takes place at the same time as political sovereignty of peoples’. This is 
particularly important for the Caribbean, where, despite achieving formal independence in the 
1960s, colonial legacies – socio-economic, cultural, and political – along with small size, 
location and vulnerability, continue to shape and constrain political realities. 
Although food sovereignty is often most strongly associated with the international peasant 
movement, La Vía Campesina (LVC), scholars have argued that achieving it involves different 
actors functioning at different scales, from the local, national and supranational (Iles and 
Montenegro de Wit, 2015; Schiavoni, 2015; Leventon and Laudan, 2017). Now enshrined in the 
constitutions of Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia, its institutionalisation as state policy has raised 
questions about the nature of sovereignty itself, the necessity to redistribute power in order to 
facilitate transformation, and the nature of state-society relations across multiple scales (McKay 
and Nehring, 2013). The concept has also been shown to have roots in a 1983 Mexican 
government ‘National Food Program’ which sought ‘to seek food sovereignty’ both in terms of 
‘self-sufficiency’ and ‘national control over various aspects of the food chain’ (Heath, 1985: 115 
quoted in Edelman 2014). Therefore, questions about the role of the state in achieving it, and the 
nature of state-civil society relations in particular contexts, have become increasingly relevant 
to transformational possibilities, alongside questions about the role of the movement itself. As 
McKay and Nehring (2013: 2) argue, the state remains crucial as key force to: ‘confront the 
global food system’; ‘dismantle unequal agrarian structures’; and 'recognize the autonomy of 
peoples and communities' to define and control their food and agricultural systems.  
At independence in the Anglo-Caribbean, the new constitutions of all nations were 
handed to them by the British; they were not developed indigenously. Most independent ex-
British colonies thus continue to operate through a Westminster-style two-party political system 
(Bishop, 2011; Girvan, 2015). Many Caribbean scholars have written in-depth about the 
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persistence of a ‘colonial mentality’ (Fanon, 2004) and the ‘validating elite’, and have called for 
the need for ‘independent thought’ (Best, 1997) and ‘sovereignty of the imagination’ (Lamming, 
2004). As Girvan (2015: 104) argues, the ‘implanting of colonial ways of thinking into native 
elites’ was one of the ‘outstanding successes of British policy in the Caribbean’. For him, 
‘sovereignty means the capacity of a society and its citizens to think for themselves…it begins 
in the mind’ (ibid). He argues that, rather than solely conflating sovereignty with the 
constitutional and juridical attributes of the state we need to re-define it in broader terms, such 
as ‘the development of structures of peoples’ empowerment at the local and community levels’ 
(ibid). He goes on to suggest food sovereignty itself as an example of this. As Bogues (2004: xi) 
argues, despite anti- and post-colonial struggles, the political independence that emerged in the 
region was in fact rather ‘limited’ with ‘hopes dashed’. This raises important questions about  
the extent of substantive sovereignty in this context. 
In the Caribbean, only a few pockets of scholarship on food sovereignty can be found. 
In Haiti and the (non-sovereign) Turks and Caicos islands, Steckley (2016) and Paddock and 
Smith (2017) show how colonial legacies of race and dietary aspirations result in a preference 
for imported food over local food, which raises both challenges for food sovereignty and the 
role of trade. In Cuba, Gürcan (2014) shows the importance of both civil and international 
political society, and state-civil society partnerships at regional, national and local levels for 
achieving food sovereignty. Cuba and Haiti are, however, highly distinctive in terms of their 
size, their Spanish and French colonial histories, and the character of their peasantries, and 
therefore, do not carry obvious lessons for the experience of the considerably smaller Anglo-
islands. In this regard, Weis (2004) and Wilson (2016), on Jamaica and T&T respectively, 
suggest food and agricultural reforms based on neoliberal logics have done little to help the poor 
farmer or the environment. Less attention, though, is focused on the broader functioning of food 
sovereignty across the independent Anglo-Caribbean, a gap that this paper addresses.   
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Applying an analysis of ‘sovereignty’ in this post-colonial context, therefore, raises 
questions about the role of political sovereignty itself for broader debates in the literature about  
the meaning and potential of food sovereignty in different geopolitical contexts. Roman-Alcalá 
(2016: 1390) usefully distinguishes between what he calls the ‘actually existing sovereignty’ of 
the state and food sovereignty’s ‘“aspirational sovereignty”, a (changed) configuration of power 
that will ostensibly help bring FS [food sovereignty] into being’. These changes may vary from 
place to place due to diversity at the local, national and supranational level. He ‘mobilises “sites” 
of sovereignty to describe spaces of decision making which share the meaning, possibilities and 
limits of FS at any scale’ such as civil society (local), state governments (national) and the World 
Committee on Food Security, transnational corporations and LVC itself (supranational). These 
sites can be analysed according to their sovereignty components in terms of ‘internal and 
external legitimacy’; capacity to ‘make rules’ and ‘to enact those rules’; and ‘territoriality’ 
(ibid). In the Anglo-Caribbean, understanding the ‘actually existing sovereignty’ of the state – 
both political and economic – is critical to understanding the possibilities for ‘aspirational 
sovereignty’.  
In order to unravel the significance of food sovereignty’s sovereignty in the Anglo-
Caribbean, we need to consider the meaning of sovereignty itself and how this varies across 
different experiences of decolonisation and independence. It is a hotly debated concept, which 
has traditionally been defined as the possession of legal and constitutional authority, yet it has 
also increasingly come to be connected to power and control (Philpott, 2001). In International 
Relations (IR), understandings of sovereignty are based on two key dynamics: internal 
sovereignty, which ‘refers to the existence of an authoritative decision making structure within 
a political entity’ that is both ‘legitimated and effective’; and external sovereignty, which ‘refers 
to the autonomy or independence of a political entity and its associated authority structure from 
external control or interference’ (Krasner, 2007: 1). As Schiavoni (2015) argues, this poses 
pertinent questions for food sovereignty and potentially unravels some of the confusion 
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surrounding who is ‘the sovereign’. Thinking about food sovereignty in these terms, she 
suggests, helps us consider two of its key dimensions: the state’s ability to control domestic food 
systems vis-à-vis the global economy as elaborated by McMichael (2014) and the domestic 
peasant- and activist-led political project that often operates independently of the state, as 
elaborated by Borras (2010).  
In this sense, the question of who is the sovereign is also crucial to its enactment. In 
LVC’s (1996) Rome statement, food sovereignty is defined as ‘the right of each nation…’. 
Therefore, the ‘sovereign’ is effectively the ‘nation-state’. However, in 2002, the definition by 
the People’s Food Sovereignty Network refers to ‘the rights of peoples…’ (Patel 2009). Here, 
the sovereign move towards ‘the people’ rather than the ‘nation’. In 2002, the International 
Planning Committee at Rome +5 similarly changed ‘nation’ to ‘peoples, communities, and 
countries’ (Edelman, 2014; Hospes, 2014). More recently, LVC’s (2007) Nyéléni Declaration 
defines it as ‘the right of peoples’. Therefore, agreement on who is the sovereign and what the 
implications of this are, can itself be subject to change. Sovereignty is consequently a crucial 
issue for the Anglo-Caribbean, both politically and economically. In this context, using it as an 
analytical tool helps to tease out some of the possibilities and tensions for both ‘actually existing’ 
and ‘aspirational’ (food) sovereignty. Drawing on Roman-Alcalá’s framework, in terms of the 
former, a key question surrounds the degree to which ‘internal’ and ‘external’ sovereignty 
currently exist (both in terms of legitimacy and control). As for the latter, a key question 
surrounds the degree to which conditions exist that could result in a changed configuration of 
power. 
 
3. Colonial Legacies and the Limitations of Food Security: Why Does Food 




The UN Food and Agriculture Organisation’s (FAO) (2015) State of Food Insecurity in the 
CARICOM Caribbean report found that the region continues to be challenged by international 
market vulnerability, climate change, natural disasters, and in particular, declining levels of 
domestic production and increased reliance on (often highly processed) imported foods high in 
fat, salt and sugar. Whilst CARICOM countries have made some progress in reducing 
undernourishment, food energy availability is ‘increasingly derived from imports’, something 
that is considered problematic for three reasons: ‘food import dependence’, ‘loss of foreign 
exchange’ and ‘increased consumption of processed foods’ (FAO, 2015: v). Although energy 
availability in all states, except Haiti, now surpasses the recommended energy guidelines of 
2400 calories per capita per day, the move towards calorie-dense but nutritionally poor diets also 
means that CARICOM territories are amongst the world’s most obese (FAO, 2015).3 ‘Food 
security’ targets have therefore largely been met by opening up Caribbean markets to cheap 
imports (that are often subsidized in the originating country) rather than improving local 
production. 
This escalating reliance on food imports continues, then, to be a pressing policy issue. In 
2015, CARICOM imported ‘in excess of US$4 billion in food annually, an increase of 50 percent 
since 2000’, a figure ‘projected to increase to US $8-10 billion by 2020 if current efforts are not 
successful in addressing this problem’ (FAO, 2015: x). Moreover, five categories - ‘processed 
foods’, ‘wheat’, ‘rice’, ‘meat’ and ‘maize’ - accounted for approximately 25 percent of annual 
regional food imports (ibid). At least seven states imported over 80 percent of their food, and 
only three - Belize, Guyana and Haiti – (which have some of the biggest land masses and are 
also by far the poorest) produced more than 50 percent of what they consume.4 Consequently, 








communities, increasing household food expenditure, thereby leaving them worse off in other 
areas (Walters and Jones, 2012).5 Despite classification as mostly middle- to high-income 
countries, acute income inequality and unemployment in the Anglo-Caribbean mean that 
poverty levels remain elevated, impacting negatively upon food accessibility and utilisation.6 
Fresh fruits and vegetables tend to be priced higher than imported processed foods, so poorer 
households are more likely to choose the latter (FAO, 2015). 
The current shape of the food system is compounded by structural legacies of production 
and consumption. Since the days of the colonial plantation, levels of domestic and subsistence 
production were, and remain today, extremely low. The structuring of the sector in this way can 
be traced back to the 16th century when European powers forcibly acquired and established 
extractive relationships with colonies. This was based on the transplantation of African slaves, 
and later indentured (predominantly Indian, but also Chinese and Portuguese) labourers, and 
plantation production systems, with the purpose of producing agricultural commodities for 
export to Europe (Best and Levitt, 2009). For half a millennium, Caribbean agriculture was 
geared solely towards international market integration and the mass production of cash crops for 
export, such as sugar, cocoa and bananas, and the importation of basic staple foods such as rice, 
flour and grains (Weis, 2007). Indigenous populations – and, with them, subsistence agriculture 
– were virtually eradicated, and replaced with monoculture agriculture for profit. The 
contemporary Caribbean remains deeply conditioned by these colonial legacies (Williams, 
1944; Thomas, 1988).  
Patterns of production and consumption that were essentially imposed upon it have also 
left a legacy of taste which can constrain possibilities for change (Lewis, 2004b; Wilson, 2013; 








consumption. Therefore, staples such as wheat, dairy, salted cod, pork and beef have been 
imported since early colonialism and are integral to local diets today. Independence did little to 
free domestic producers from the vagaries of the global food system, and instead increased the 
reliance upon imported, processed, calorie-dense but nutritionally poor foods. As Wilson (2013: 
107) finds, ‘modern’ food choices such as Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC) often prevail over 
efforts to localise food. It is widely recognised that the Caribbean continues to operate in an 
environment in which such ‘external forces still play a major role’ (Beckford and Rhiney, 2016: 
xii). Both the colonial legacy and the small size of Anglo-Caribbean nations places them in a 
uniquely vulnerable position with regards to the impact of global trade imbalances and market 
changes. They consequently remain at the mercy of structural forces; intensifying trade 
liberalisation since the 1980s has caused only to compound this.  
              In sum, conventional ‘food security’ policy prescriptions have increased calorie 
availability, but negatively impacted on rising imports levels, nutritional quality, availability of 
affordable fresh fruits and vegetables, and the ability to produce local food for local 
consumption. In this context, the political agenda of ‘food sovereignty’ – i.e. ‘the right of each 
nation to maintain and develop its own capacity to produce its basic foods, respecting cultural 
and productive diversity’ (La Vía Campesina, 1996: 1) – carries significant weight. A key goal 
of ‘food sovereignty’ is to collectively resist economic growth-focused models of food security, 
industrialisation and agricultural globalisation. It therefore goes beyond the mainstream food 
security focus on availability, accessibility, utilization and nutrition to also include 
consideration of where food comes from and how it is produced, and extends to claim the rights 
of nations and peoples to define their own agriculture and food policies and systems (Desmarais, 
2003). These additional considerations are particularly pertinent to the context of the Anglo-
Caribbean: in the CARICOM policy environment, a tension has long existed between externally 
imposed ‘food security’ discourses that have become dominated by market-centrism and more 




4. CARICOM Food and Agricultural Policy Discourses Since the 1970s: Dominant 
Narratives of Liberalisation vs Self-Sufficiency? 
 
Since the 1970s, the Caribbean has undergone significant political and economic change, 
impacting its approach to food and agriculture. This section substantiates the claim that, despite 
some attempts at alternative approaches, CARICOM policy-making has been dominated by 
neoliberal food and agricultural development discourses prevailing in global policy-making 
circles. Ultimately, it argues that this limits the possibilities of moving towards the six key pillars 
of food sovereignty: in particular, localising food production, valuing local producers and 
increasing levels of local control. Prior to the 1970s, agricultural policies were large-scale and 
export-orientated rather than aligned to domestic production. However, with most territories 
achieving independence in this era, and the establishment of CARICOM in 1973, policy took a 
strong turn towards domestic production for local consumption and food self-sufficiency. 
Globally, the 1970s were also characterised by the oil shocks of 1973, food price crises and 
global imbalances in supply and demand, which led to the emergence of the concept of ‘food 
security’ at the 1974 World Food Conference. With new nationalist agendas, a new regional 
outlook, and amidst an atmosphere of crisis, Caribbean governments saw the need for 
reorganising research and policy priorities to develop production of food crops for local 
consumption and non-traditional commodities for export (Axline, 1984). In this period, the 
CARICOM food import bill was already high for a region whose economies were still primarily 
agricultural, further stimulating action and the need for a regionally integrated approach geared 
towards the goal of greater sustainability (ibid).  
It was in this context that CARICOM prepared its first regional agricultural policy, the 
Regional Food Plan (RFP) (1975), to address increasing concerns around satisfying basic needs, 
moving towards self-sufficiency and improving domestic production (Axline, 1984). Its main 
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thrust was import substitution agriculture. Influenced by the theories of the New World Group - 
an intellectual movement of radical Caribbean thinkers active in the pre- and post-independence 
period of the 1960s and 1970s – it aimed to reduce foreign dependency by increasing local 
production and reducing imports via tariffs.7 It also signified renewed acknowledgement of the 
importance of agriculture, with the establishment of the Caribbean Agricultural Research and 
Development Institute (CARDI) in 1975, and the Caribbean Food Corporation (CFC) in 1976 
as the plan’s chief implementation agencies.8 In 1976, its remit was broadened to include rural 
development issues, productivity, income redistribution, quality and health. However, the 
expected outcomes never materialised, apparently due to lack of political commitment and 
technical capacity, fiscal crises, and the declining ability to purchase imports (Axline, 1984; 
Kirton, 2003). It was also impacted by broader structural constraints. Multilateral trade 
instruments signed in the 1970s and 1980s, such as the Lomé Convention (1975) and the 
Caribbean Basin Initiative (1982), worked in opposition to many of the proposed objectives of 
the RFP, by encouraging the expansion and strengthening of traditional extra-regional 
agricultural export sectors, and reinforcing metropolitan links inherited from colonialism.  
Aggravating these tendencies, the Caribbean debt crisis of the 1970s led to the imposition 
of neoliberal economic restructuring in many CARICOM member states by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. In the late 1970s, Jamaica took IMF loans with tourism, 
export-processing and financial services becoming new priorities, whilst agriculture support 
programmes were dismantled and public lands were sold to encourage the development of 
commercial agro-export orientated farms (Weis, 2004). According to the World Bank (1982: 
32) the overall objective was ‘economic recovery and sustained growth through the adoption of 









between 1961 and 2013, whilst the population of Jamaica increased by a factor of 1.64, imports 
of wheat increased by 1.92, vegetables by 4, fruits by 6.7, and poultry by a whopping 43 
(FAOSTAT, 2013).9 In 1988, faced with a collapse in oil prices and a large repayment to 
creditors, T&T also took a loan from the IMF (Levitt, 2005).10 Prior to this, throughout the 1980s 
the government instituted a range of IMF-advised austerity measures, including devaluation, the 
lowering of wages, a reduction in all agricultural subsidies (except milk) from TTD $62 million 
in 1983 to TTD $22 million in 1987 (USD 25.6 to 6.1 million), and the dismantling of protective 
systems, price controls and import restrictions (World Bank, 1989).11 The liberalisation of 
exchange and import restrictions were therefore critical to both programmes. Yet these policies 
only deepened trade imbalances stemming from enduring post-colonial structures of production 
(Weis, 2007). By re-embedding the Caribbean food and agricultural sector in a neo-colonial 
global food economy and weakening sovereign sustainability, food insecurity only increased 
(Thomas-Hope and Jardine-Comrie, 2007).  
Nonetheless, several more attempts were made to revive the RFP with the publication of 
CARICOM Feeds Itself: A Regional Food and Nutrition Strategy (1983) and the Caribbean 
Community Programme for Agricultural Development (CCPAD) (1989). However, each new 
reincarnation faced the same structural and institutional constraints, agriculture continued to 
decline, and the sector remained largely export-orientated, vertically integrated, and 
consumption continued to be import-dependent. With greater liberalisation of agricultural trade 
as a result of the WTO Uruguay Round, efforts were further eroded and constrained by the unfair 
competitive advantage of cheap subsidised imports from the north which out-competed local 
farmers (Rosset, 2006). With admission to the WTO in 1995, CARICOM responded with the 








‘narrowly on promoting enhanced productivity and competitiveness of identified commodities 
for regional and external markets’ (FAO, 2013). CARICOM policy thus turned even more 
towards market and trade-focused narratives, becoming firmly rooted within the dominant 
global neoliberal turn.  
Therefore, the problems of Caribbean dependency and decline have never been solved. 
Liberalisation has largely been negative for small-scale farmers, with the increased importation 
of ‘cheap’ food and deteriorating conditions and supports. Kendall and Petracco (2009: 6) argue 
that the major beneficiaries have ‘been large producers/commercial farms; traders and 
middlemen; large companies and multi-national firms’, whereas small farmers have benefited 
significantly less, if at all, facing increased unemployment and poverty.12 For example, in the 
Windward Island nations, liberalisation eroded preferences and the quota system under which 
‘a relatively sustainable and socially efficient banana industry emerged and grew’ and ‘whose 
banana exports more than doubled from 1960 to 1990’ (Fridell, 2013: 620). But with the end of 
preferences the number of banana farmers dropped from 27000 in 1992 to 4000 in 2009 (ibid). 
Banana farmers in the Eastern Caribbean were consequently dramatically worse off (Payne, 
2006; Wilson and Jackson, 2016). The same is also true for sugar workers elsewhere (see: 
Richardson and Richardson-Ngwenya, 2013). 
Since the 2007-08 food crisis, continued calls have been made to rethink the model of 
Caribbean agriculture. A proposed approach was set out in two key CARICOM documents: the 
Liliendaal Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security (LDAFS) (CARICOM, 2009), a 
political statement of commitment by the CARICOM Heads of Government; and the Regional 
Food and Nutrition Security Policy (RFNSP) for the period 2011-2025 (CARICOM, 2010) 








for policy development and implementation by Member States. The key focus is to diversify 
and increase the competitiveness of agriculture, to attend to its contribution to food security, 
environmental sustainability, employment, and a more equitable distribution of income, poverty 
reduction and health (Kendall and Petracco, 2009). Nonetheless, key messages emanating from 
both show that CARICOM’s strategic approach continues to prioritise neoclassical approaches 
to trade and development, which benefit agri-business and other vertically integrated networks, 
rather than small-farmers and local producers. For example, the Liliendaal Declaration 
emphasises a renewed commitment to several market-centric objectives, such as: the 
transformation of the agricultural sector into an ‘internationally competitive sector’ and its 
contribution to ‘sustained economic development’, the ‘economic livelihood of entrepreneurs’ 
and to ‘food and nutrition security’ (CARICOM, 2009: 1). Recognition of the importance of 
‘vulnerable rural groups such as indigenous and other tribal peoples, youth and women’ is also 
couched in terms of bringing ‘them into the economic mainstream’ (ibid). Likewise, the 
emphasis on increasing ‘internationally competitive, market-led production’ and enabling a 
‘stronger agriculture private sector’ are indicative of policy orientation (CARICOM, 2009: 2). 
Similarly, the RFNSP, whilst committing to the improvement of local production, 
reinforces a strict adherence to the FAO’s conceptualisation of ‘food security’. It aims to achieve 
this by providing a ‘comprehensive’ and ‘holistic’ framework’ to ensure: ‘regional food 
production, processing, distribution, marketing, trade, and food safety and [sic] agricultural 
public health system is capable of providing safe, adequate, nutritious and affordable food for 
the region’s inhabitants’ (CARICOM, 2010, 4). The RFNSP, therefore, continues to represent 
an externally imposed food and agricultural development strategy, and is strongly aligned to 
market-centric policy solutions. What is also stark in the RFSNP, as well as the policies which 
preceded it, is that there is little explicit discussion about what approach to agriculture should 
be taken - the who and how. It alludes to both public-private partnerships and incentives for 
small farmers, however, as Claxton (2012) finds, it exclusively advocates conventional 
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agricultural practices as the solution to food security. Moreover, it conforms to the World Bank’s 
model of ‘value chain’ farming, potentially reproducing both ‘the corporate food regime’ and 
its ‘associated climate risks’, and neglects to address the ‘climate change adaptation and 
mitigation potential of agroecological practices’ (Wilson, 2016: 2).  
What this analysis of the regional policy environment shows is that, although calls for 
improving domestic production and self-sufficiency – which align with some, but not all of the 
core tenets of food sovereignty - have been key motifs of CARICOM policies for feeding its 
nations, the ebbs and flows of Caribbean food and agriculture have been more strongly impacted 
by global trends towards liberalisation. A plethora of policy activity, and renewed calls for 
agricultural development, food security and poverty alleviation, have in reality been followed 
by a combined lack of political will, interest and investment. Policies have remained firmly 
within a market-based approach to food security, focused largely on increasing market value. 
The result has been that ‘food security’ has become synonymous with the increased importation 
of ‘cheap food’, much of which is highly processed, mass-produced and subsidised in country 
of origin. By and large, since the independence era, despite the rallying cries of politicians and 
farmers, regional policy has moved continually away from the goal of challenging fundamental 
structural constraints: as such, the prospect of increasing self-sufficiency and local production 
for local consumption remains elusive, despite the resources that have been committed to it.  
 
5. Food Sovereignty in the Anglo-Caribbean: Partial Mobilisations and Distinctive 
Peasant Landscapes 
 
Although conventional discourses dominate, this section explores examples of where food 
sovereignty discourses have been mobilised, albeit partially, in the Caribbean. Using LVC 
membership as a proxy, and looking across its contemporary geographical dispersal, it is 
apparent that formal food sovereignty organising has been far more prevalent in Latin America 
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and the Hispanophone Caribbean than in the independent, Anglo-Caribbean. In 2013, LVC had 
164 membership organisations, spread across 73 countries, and just over half resided in the 
Americas.14 In North America, Mexico, Canada and the United States all have member bodies 
(7 in total). In South America, almost every country has members (40 in total), apart from the 
three that are generally considered ‘Caribbean’ territories (Guyana, Suriname and French 
Guiana). Similarly, in Central America (which has 26 members), all seven non-Caribbean region 
countries - Costa Rica, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Panama, Honduras – 
have member organisations, whilst Belize, the only Caribbean (and Anglo) nation does not. This 
implies a revealing demarcation: in the island Caribbean itself (which has 13 members), all three 
Hispanophone countries – Cuba, Dominican Republic (DR) and Puerto Rico – have members, 
as does Haiti. However, the majority of Anglo nations - Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, 
Barbados, Jamaica, Guyana, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Suriname, and T&T – do not. 
The ones that do – Dominica, Grenada, St Lucia and St Vincent and the Grenadines (SVG) – 
are represented under the umbrella of the Windward Islands Farmers Association (WINFA). 
So, what makes WINFA distinctive? WINFA was established in 1987 as an umbrella 
group for farmers’ associations in the Windward Isles: the Grenada Cane Farmers Association 
(GCFA); the National Farmers’ Unions of SVG and St Lucia; and the WINFA Dominica branch 
(IICA, 1992). The organisation’s key role is lobbying to support the livelihoods of small-scale 
banana farmers and the promotion of Fairtrade bananas which are sold in British and European 
supermarkets (ibid). Interestingly, as part of this agenda, a WINFA delegation attended the 1992 
Congress of the Nicaraguan National Union of Agriculturalists and Livestock Producers, 
Managua, where the declaration laid the foundation for the establishment of LVC the following 
year in Mons, Belgium (Desmarais, 2002, 2007; Kopka, 2013).15 Therefore, the concept of ‘food 
																																																								
14	LVC	members	are	predominantly	a	mix	of	producer	organizations,	farmer	and	farm	worker	unions,	and	
farmer	 cooperatives.	 Although,	 there	 is	 a	 distinction	 between	 LVC	 as	 an	 organization	 and	 food	
sovereignty	as	a	concept,	membership	is	a	useful	proxy	of	organized	activity.	




sovereignty’ can be seen to have been diffused through Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) 
regional farmer-group gatherings. The headquarters of WINFA is also based in SVG which is 
part of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America–Peoples’ Trade Treaty (ALBA-
TCP), founded by Venezuela and Cuba in 2004 and consequently has connections with more 
socialist-leaning nations in the wider hemisphere. Indeed, in 2008, at the ALBA-TCP ‘“Food for 
Life” Presidential Summit on Food Sovereignty and Security’, SVG agreed to ‘25 actions and 
common positions consonant with food sovereignty’ (Muhr, 2013: 130).16 Eleven other LAC 
Heads of State also discussed integrating food sovereignty into their regional strategies 
(Beuchelt and Virchow, 2012), but none were Anglo-Caribbean nations.  
Nonetheless, diffusion of food sovereignty principles can be found amongst some 
farmers’ groups in the Anglo region. For example, one of the key drivers of the GCFA, founded 
in the 1980s, was to transform Grenada’s sugarcane sector through the refinement of traditional 
intercropping techniques and collective labour methods of their forbearers, thereby enacting ‘a 
repeasantization of a kind’ (Kopka, 2013: 15). However, the GCFA experienced many 
constraints (ibid). Internally, tourist development, natural disasters (two hurricanes) and 
government pressure to commercialise small farms and cuts in supports to small and subsistence 
farmers hampered progress. Externally, constraints ranged from the aforementioned ‘persistent 
hold of export-orientated plantation agriculture on the island’s economy’ to the ‘pressures of 
neoliberal governance and international debt’ (Kopka, 2013: 14). Although the GCFA positively 
impacted local production, contributed to food independence, and improved the status and well-
being of small farmers, Kopka (2013: 339) found that – ‘preoccupied with the growth of the 
organization and members’ survival’ it failed to develop a strong voice in national discussions 
about agriculture, the importance of small farming and food sovereignty. As one official 







2013: 340). Therefore, whilst farmers’ groups mobilised towards food sovereignty, official 
government policy prioritised the development of medium-to-large commercial farms over 
small and subsistence farmers. 
The tension between supporting small farmers and promoting large commercial farm 
projects is controversial in many Caribbean nations. In Trinidad, food and agricultural policies, 
despite encompassing incentives programmes for all farmers, have persistently focused on the 
attempted institution of commercial ‘mega-farms’ through public-private partnerships 
(MFPLMA, 2011). Furthermore, small farmers face multiple barriers to accessing incentives, 
such as administrative red-tape, corruption, prejudice, hidden agendas and the necessity to have 
upfront capital to purchase goods prior to receiving subsidy payments (Thompson, 2017).17 In 
2007, a group of representatives from various local farmers’ organisations presented to 
CARICOM an ‘Agricultural Manifesto’ framed by the principles of food sovereignty, calling 
for ‘bottom-up solutions’ and ‘participation’ over ‘consultation’. Yet it was largely ignored by 
local government officials.18 According to one Senior Representative from the local branch of 
the FAO, ‘the reality of the matter comes down to trade policy’ and ‘political will’ (ibid).19  
In Trinidad, the discourse of food sovereignty has, though, crept into the narratives of 
some policy-makers and politicians, where it is most frequently mobilised narrowly to draw 
attention to the imperative of increasing local production, rather than its wider political and 
ideological principles. The first mention of it in Parliament, in 2005, by the then Prime Minister 
and leader of the People’s National Movement, Patrick Manning, outlined the government’s 
strategy ‘to improve food security and food sovereignty’ through ‘development of strategic 
agricultural subsectors’, ‘a sustainable rural development agenda’, ‘youth involvement’ and 
‘competitiveness in export and domestic markets’ (Parliament of Trinidad and Tobago, 2005: 







critical to the ‘mission’ of achieving developed country status by 2020. Here, food sovereignty 
was reductively mobilised to emphasise local production, but little else. In 2012, the Minister of 
Food Production (of the subsequent People’s Partnership Government), Jairam Seemungal,  
moved closer to its core tenets when he called for ‘shifting the dialogue’ away from the goal of 
‘food security’ towards the ‘more all-embracing’ and ‘higher and laudable’ objective of ‘food 
sovereignty’ in order to ‘underpin the twin objective of diversification of the economy and 
insulating us from the exploitation of international food suppliers’ (Parliament of Trinidad and 
Tobago, 2012: 938). However, in reality, the Trinidadian state made few successful moves with 
regards to addressing the asymmetries of trade facing it, or the wider region, vis-à-vis the global 
market. Moreover, national food production policies continued to emphasise heavily the 
development of large commercial farms. 
Arguably, in some senses food sovereignty has entered the Caribbean as a development 
discourse as well as a grassroots movement. After a regional meeting of CARICOM Agricultural 
Ministers in Grenada, one newspaper headline read: ‘Food Sovereignty Replaces Food Security 
as Major Caribbean Theme’ (Antigua Observer, 2010). However, the emphasis often continues 
to be placed on increasing local food production without equal emphasis paid to the necessary 
conditions and power imbalances that need to be addressed in order to move towards a position 
where nations and peoples might be able to define their local food and agriculture policy and to 
participate in decision-making. As the Director of the Trinidad-based Caribbean Agricultural 
Research and Development Institute (CARDI) commented at the same meeting: ‘When we talk 
of sovereignty, it is about the ability of the region to produce food for itself’ (Jamaican Gleaner, 
November 7, 2010). Therefore, as has been found elsewhere, rhetorically questions of 
democracy and justice are often absent (Windfuhr and Jonsén, 2005), as are questions of 
international trade (Paddock and Smith, 2017). This can pose difficulties for small-island 
nations, as food sovereignty discourses tend to lean towards an anti-international trade stance 
and a preference for local markets (Burnett and Murphy, 2014).  
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The limited existence of strong contemporary subaltern social and peasant movements 
in the Anglo-Caribbean, both nationally and regionally, also limits mobilisation. While many 
Latin American countries have a strong pre-colonial indigenous peasant presence, in the 
Caribbean the indigenous inhabitants were all but wiped out by colonial invaders. As Altieri and 
Toledo (2011) point out, Mexico has a long history of rural community organising and 
indigenous agrarian knowledge, whilst countries such as Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador also have 
strong indigenous rural movements which are the driving force of change and anti-neoliberal 
sentiment. They further suggest that in ‘the Latin American context, Mexico is in agrarian terms 
a unique country’, with the revolution of 1910-1917 bringing ‘the first agrarian reform on the 
continent, leaving in the hands of the peasant and indigenous communities a great part of the 
land, forests and native germplasm’ (Altieri and Toledo, 2011: 604). This has had a lasting 
impact on the organisation of Mexico’s agrarian landscape today, where, notwithstanding 
privatisation in the 1990s, land is largely socially owned, equitably distributed and community 
organized (ibid). Similarly, in Cuba, Wilson (2017) finds the development of alternative food 
networks to be a case of ‘exceptionalism’ in the Caribbean due to its unique history that saw 
plantation society arrive late onto an already-agrarian society, and also its changing post-
revolutionary relations with the Soviet Union and the United States. The conditions in which 
alternative food sovereignty movements emerge are, therefore, culturally, socially and 
politically specific. In many ways, Mexico and Cuba, both had the social and political 
foundations that food sovereignty requires.  
Yet much of the Anglo-Caribbean lacks indigenous farmer movements with long 
historical roots. Most of the islands are far smaller than Cuba or Haiti, and in many cases they 
have populations of less than 150,000. Moreover, as Mintz (1989) argued, the peasantry is a 
‘reconstituted’ one, having begun life other than as peasants and emerging from diverse 
experiences on the margins of European colonial enterprise – as squatters, early yeomen, proto-
peasantry, deserters or runaways. Unlike in Asia, Europe and Africa, there was no ‘pre-
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capitalist’ peasantry (Best and Levitt 2009).20 Instead, domestically-focused agriculture did not 
fully emerge until after the abolition of slavery. Colonial policies also attempted to prevent its 
growth, by restricting access to land and perpetuating elite (i.e. plantocracy) wealth 
accumulation (Besson, 2003). This legacy still plays out today, with land distribution 
characterised by inequitable ownership and control, insecurity of tenure, high levels of state 
ownership, little progress in terms of land reform (Toppin-Allahar, 2013) and a peasantry which 
is often viewed as individualistic in nature (Beckford, 1972). For example, in Trinidad, farmers 
are still seen to ‘work independently’ and tend to organize to ‘work together in their own 
interests’ (Theodore, 2007: 11).21 As Bernstein (2014) and Edelman (2014) have argued, one 
problem with food sovereignty is the assumption of a homogenous peasantry, a point that the 
Anglo-Caribbean’s uniqueness reinforces. Due to its distinct history, it not only lacks a strong 
peasant movement, but also struggles against colonial legacies of unequal land distribution and 
individualism which can work against the forming of cooperatives, thereby perpetuating the 
problem. 
In sum, although food sovereignty discourses have been adopted by some farmers’ 
groups and politicians, the focus is often a re-emphasis on local food production and self-
sufficiency rather than the more democratic ideals of the right to define local food and 
agricultural systems and to challenge the inequities of international trade. Moreover, in political 
discourse, food sovereignty is often mobilised as an addendum to food security, rather than as a 
political project in itself. Although important, this necessarily reduces food sovereignty to little 
more than decreasing import bills and obscures its more radical and core underlying political 









6. Still Searching? Caribbean Sovereignties and Possibilities for Transformation 
 
So, what are the possibilities for what Roman-Alcalá calls ‘aspirational’ food sovereignty in the 
Anglo-Caribbean? In order to answer this question, we must understand the actually existing 
sovereignty of the independent Caribbean state, both political and economic, and its internal and 
external dynamics. The region offers a unique case study in this regard, particularly in terms of 
its colonial legacy.  
To grasp the distinctiveness of Anglo-Caribbean notions of sovereignty, it is useful to 
consider alternatives. Sovereignty is both a contested, ideological concept that has been 
developed in particular geographical and historical contexts, and is subject to change over time 
(Conversi, 2016). In Britain, ‘internal’ sovereignty has generally been seen to belong to a 
particular institution (Parliament) whereas in Spain and other continental European countries it 
is seen to belong to a specific collectivity (the people or the nation) (Witte, 1995). This is in part 
because continental ‘popular sovereignty’ influenced, and was influenced by, the American 
(1765-1783) and French (1789-1798) revolutions of the 18th century and, in the case of the US, 
the revolutionaries who rejected the sovereignty of the British parliament (ibid). For obvious 
reasons, the British did not favour this new notion of popular sovereignty and continued to invest 
national identity in symbols such as the monarch and the church, and their related institutions.  
This can still be seen in the Anglo-Caribbean, with power residing in the state and the 
government rather than ‘the people’, and it has pertinent consequences for modes of governance 
and the enactment of sovereignty. These differences are also compounded by divergent paths of 
independence and decolonisation, which throughout LAC were largely demarcated by colonial 
nationality. The Haitian Revolution of 1791 was swiftly followed by the Latin American wars 
of independence, whereby most of Hispanic Latin America secured liberation by the 1820s, 
followed by the DR in 1844 and Cuba in 1901 (Oostindie and Klinkers, 2003). In South America, 
the only countries not to secure independence at this time were non-Hispanic and sparsely 
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settled: Guyana, Suriname and French Guiana. Moreover, British Caribbean nations did not 
achieve independence until the 1960s, and for some islands not until the 1980s. Independence 
therefore came much later. These histories have arguably left a markedly different understanding 
of sovereignty in the Anglo-Caribbean compared to Latin America and the non-Anglophone 
Caribbean.  
So, what do we mean when we talk of ‘internal’ sovereignty in the Anglo-Caribbean? 
Arguably, it is understood to reside not in the people, but the state, and, in the small territories, 
even just with dominant leaders (Singham, 1968). As Bishop and Payne (2010: 10) argue, 
Anglo-Caribbean island states suffer from problems of both statehood and sovereignty, in that 
they ‘continue to sustain an enduring conceptualization of sovereignty which is both narrow and 
considered to be the sole preserve of national leaderships’. Caribbean leaders therefore continue 
to hold onto an elite conception of personal sovereignty (Gilbert-Roberts, 2013). Furthermore, 
the Westminster two-party model continues to dominate; the consequence of this is that 
meaningful political participation is limited. This differs substantially to the experiments in 
participatory democracy taking place across Latin America (Girvan, 2015), including most 
obviously and crucially, in its agrarian movements. Therefore, the possibilities for ‘the people’ 
to play a role in the decision-making processes of aspirational food sovereignty are arguably 
currently more limited, or at least certainly more challenging, in the Anglo-Caribbean than 
elsewhere.  
As we have seen, ‘external’ sovereignty – in terms of political and economic autonomy 
from external control or interference – has always been limited in Caribbean nations. As 
Lamming argues (2004: 12) ‘independence’ had ‘not yet won the right to sovereignty’: from 
1938 onwards the ‘transnational corporation assumed a novel dominance in all regional affairs’ 
with ‘domestic policy’ ‘determined by international lending agencies’. For Lamming (2004: vii) 
the ‘deeply cherished ideals of independence, freedom of thought, of speech and of association, 
and sovereignty itself are threatened with slaughter on the altar of the market’. Lewis (2004a: 
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321) similarly argues that ‘even when formal political independence occurred… the political 
sovereignty was rendered null and void, in large part by the economic sovereignty exercised by 
the metropolitan business forces’. External sovereignty has been further eroded by strong pro-
market and pro-free trade politics, coupled with the European Commission’s Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPA) which opened up Caribbean markets to EU exports (Bishop et 
al., 2012). The decline and neglect of agriculture in the Caribbean has therefore been magnified 
by these processes, along with a general lack of power vis-à-vis the global food economy. Now 
that preferential trade has been eroded, global trade rules and regulations defined primarily by 
the US and EU have limited the ability of small Caribbean producers to compete. In this sense, 
the kind of meaningful sovereignty that would enable ‘local decisions’ to be made independently 
of the ‘dictates of global capital in accordance with domestic requirements’ (Lewis, 2012: 4) 
remains one of the key challenges facing the region today.  
There also exists a strong tension between national and regional understandings of 
sovereignty in the independent Anglo-Caribbean, with it mobilised nationally by local actors 
within each territory, and regionally at the CARICOM level, with the two often coming into 
conflict. Responses to challenges and vulnerabilities, such as food security and food sovereignty, 
are often framed as requiring regional action (Lowitt et al., 2016). Therefore, the question of 
who is the sovereign extends not just from ‘the nation’ to ‘the people’ but also to concerns of 
regionalism. As Girvan (2015: 105) puts it, ‘the concept of “shared sovereignty” is on the table’: 
‘sharing selected attributes of constitutional sovereignty with regional partners so as to enhance 
the substantive sovereignty of each’. He sees this as particularly important for issues such as 
food, security, climate change, and negotiations with external donors (ibid). Although these 
concerns have been little applied to the issue of food sovereignty specifically, questions of 
regionalism and sovereignty have long been central to the Caribbean project of independence 
and the development of regional governance mechanisms, such as CARICOM (Bishop and 
Payne 2010; Gilbert-Roberts 2013).  
	
	 27	
With regards to the question of food sovereignty’s sovereignty in the independent Anglo-
Caribbean, three of the six pillars arguably resonate most: valuing food producers, localising 
food systems and putting control locally.22 Consequently, we might ask, in terms of these, to 
what extent could food sovereignty be fully realised in this context? Food and agricultural policy 
continues to be externally supported and funded by international development institutions, such 
as the EU, FAO and the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA). 
Furthermore, the success of mobilisations of regional sovereignty are limited by diversity 
between CARICOM member states with regards to agricultural priorities and agendas. For 
example, whereas more industrialised nations such as T&T favour voluntary regulation 
regarding issues such as biosafety, Eastern Caribbean nations that supply niche organic products 
to the EU favour more comprehensive regulation and legislation. These diverging experiences 
and interests – which bedevil all areas of policy – have fundamentally limited the Caribbean 
project of regionalism since the short-lived Federation of the West Indies (1958-1962) that 
aimed to politically unite the ex-colonies of Britain collapsed (Payne, 2008). Girvan (2015) has 
thus argued that new creative thinking is needed to transcend the form of regionalism 
represented by CARICOM, combined with the transformation of democracy away from the 
‘shackles of Westminsterism’ towards popular participation. Both would give more form to the 
possibilities for aspirational food sovereignty in the region, and more power to small island 
states vis-à-vis the global economy. Internally, citizens would have more say, as both producers 
and consumers, over the shape of food and agricultural policy. 
 
7. Conclusion 
This article interrogated the distinctive social, historical, political and economic location 







articulated in often partial and distinctive ways. Although the food crises of the 1970s and 2007-
08 raised renewed national and regional calls to improve ‘self-sufficiency’ and ‘domestic food 
production’, food and agricultural related policy-making has continued to be dominated by 
externally imposed development discourses and market-centric ‘food security’ approaches, 
shaped further by the Caribbean’s externally propelled and asymmetric integration into global 
networks of production, distribution and consumption. Moreover, the principles of ‘food 
sovereignty’ have not always travelled easily to the particular context of the Anglo-Caribbean. 
Despite mobilisation by some farmers’ groups, distinctive legacies of state-farmer relations and 
enduring structural constraints have meant that this is weaker than elsewhere in the wider LAC 
region. When mobilised at the political level, food sovereignty has often been appropriated as a 
political discourse to draw attention to the call to increase local food production, rather than as 
a political project in itself grounded in the struggle for peasant rights and participation in 
decision-making. This means that calls for food sovereignty have often been adopted in ways 
that work within the neoliberal economic and liberal state environment, rather than against it, 
and the right of ‘the people’ to decide is depoliticised in this context.  
As Clive Thomas (1988: 346) argued some years ago, the Caribbean ‘has always been a 
battle ground of world views’. Its societies and economies have been conditioned by centuries 
of colonialism focused on agricultural production for export, and the generation of profits which 
accrue externally. The contemporary food system continues to reflect this legacy and historically 
its international market integration has been almost exclusively propelled from the outside. 
Moreover, it remains dominated by global distribution networks of transporters, traders and 
retailers with roots in the US and Europe (and now increasingly South America and Asia). The 
legacy of the plantation economy system also means that the development of the peasantry in 
the Anglo-Caribbean has been a relatively contemporary phenomenon compared to the rest of 
the world, emerging from the specific conditions of and the abolition of slavery. This means 
that, in stark contrast to the emergence of radical subaltern movements in South and Central 
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America, the conditions for the development of a strong agrarian movement are lacking, but as 
this paper has argued these structural legacies alone do not explain why food sovereignty 
discourses play out as they do.  
Indeed, by applying a wider analysis of ‘sovereignty’ to the case of the independent 
nations of the Anglo-Caribbean, this paper has produced insights into how the actual conditions 
of both ‘internal’ and ‘external’ sovereignty frame the ways in which the concept has been 
translated locally and, in turn, circumscribe possibilities for change. In terms of ‘external’ 
sovereignty, the independent states of the English-speaking Caribbean have little power vis-à-
vis the global political economy, and have long been entrenched in an environment of trade 
liberalisation and rising imports, despite repeated (unsuccessful) calls to improve local 
production and self-sufficiency. Anglo-Caribbean states also have a unique conceptualisation of 
‘internal’ sovereignty, influenced by a distinctive British colonial history that conceptualises 
sovereign power as in the hands of ‘the state’ and its leaders rather than ‘the people’. This differs 
dramatically from states in South and Central America which centre ‘the people’ to conceptions 
of sovereignty. Therefore, although it is true that most states globally are entrenched in a 
neoliberal environment, the political principles of ‘food sovereignty’ are limited more 
dramatically in these small island nations due to a peculiarly British conception of sovereignty. 
Moreover, combined with a lack of strong agrarian movements, this significantly limits the 
possibilities for mobilisation as a political project. In other words, the required prerequisites of 
both ‘internal’ and ‘external’ political sovereignty in this case are diminished.  
This matters for wider debates in the geographies of food and food sovereignty 
literatures, because it shows how global norms around food sovereignty are mediated differently 
by British colonial history, geo-politics and culture, and do not always travel as well as we might 
think, even when people in those cultures invoke them. It draws attention to the need for further 
research on how the conditions of political sovereignty itself impact upon the translation of the 
concept and possibilities for transformation supposedly embodied in food sovereignty 
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discourses. Trauger (2014) has made a similar argument, reflecting (in the US context) that the 
primacy of the market to liberal sovereignty runs counter to, and therefore mutes, the radical 
aims of food sovereignty. As we have seen, this certainly happens in the Anglo-Caribbean too. 
But what is different is that local invocations of food sovereignty, limited and partial as they 
may be, also often end up reproducing narrow agricultural discourses stripped of their radical 
potential, because of distinctive local conceptions of sovereignty more broadly. This raises 
questions of how food sovereignty movements can adapt to work in environments where due to 
small size, structural constraints and the power vested in the state, the possibilities for food 
movement organising are even more limited. Future research in this area, to return to Roman-
Alcalá’s (2016) framing, could therefore explore the ‘actually existing’ and ‘aspirational’ 
conditions of internal authoritative, legitimate and effective decision-making structures within 
political entities and the external conditions of independent control and influence. 
This case study also matters to wider debates in the development literature on food and 
agricultural policy-making at the national, regional and global level. The Anglo-Caribbean case 
brings into sharp view how implementing food security policies has worked hand in hand with 
policies that further liberalised trade to deliver ‘cheap food’, which, while improving 
availability, have further eroded substantive food sovereignty and domestic production, with the 
unexpected consequence of creating new dietary related issues, such as an increased prevalence 
of obesity and diabetes. The global policy shift from a focus on ‘agriculture’ to one on ‘food’ in 
the 1970s represented both a signal and symptom of these changes. Without broader checks and 
balances in the global food system it is difficult to see how distinctive small-island regions such 
as the Anglo-Caribbean can easily overcome these challenges: while the tenets of food 
sovereignty that relate to local food production and control have found limited resonance against 
immense structural constraints, matters of trade, participation in decision-making, and the focus 
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